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The Mid-Life Crisis of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Hilary Charlesworth*
I. Introduction
A half century in a human life is regarded as a particularly significant
anniversary because it is viewed as mid-life -fifty years is at least the halfway
point in a person's earthly existence. We anticipate that, by the age of fifty, a
person is at the apogee of their development. We expect them to have fulfilled
any promi.e they showed as a young person and to have tied up loose ends.
We are impatient with any signs of unexploited talent and missed opportuni-
ties. At the same time, the age of fifty is sometimes associated with mid-life
crises that propel middle aged individuals into dramatic change in personal
relationships or in work. Mid-life crises take a variety of forms. Sometimes
a mid-life crisis is an attempt to live a more authentic existence, an existence
that is truer to the real desires of the person than the imposed traditional
lifestyle they previously have followed. Other mid-life crises may be attempts
to slough off responsibilities and to cling to a youth that has passed.
These somewhat contradictory currents are implicated in the fiftieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declara-
tion).' Some reactions to the fiftieth anniversary will be purely celebratory-
it is, after all, a great feat that this set of human rights standards adopted in the
tense post-war world has achieved widespread acceptance, at least in the sense
that no state has denounced it, and more positively in the sense that it has been
widely implemented in national legal systems. Other responses to the fiftieth
anniversary will be tempered by the sustained resistance to many of the Uni-
versal Declaration's provisions. Some states are reluctant to be bound fully to
the treaty translations of the Universal Declaration's provisions. Some states
claim that the Universal Declaration and the United Nations (U.N.) system of
human rights protection is a reflection of Western values and therefore is a
vehicle of cultural imperialism. Some activists and scholars claim that in our
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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globalized world, the provisions of the Universal Declaration are completely
inadequate to respond to the real threats facing humanity.
In this paper, I focus on one element of mid-life benchmarks: What
relevance is the Universal Declaration - and the body of human rights law it
has generated -to women's lives around the world? My argument is that the
Universal Declaration can be likened to a certain type of fifty-year-old man.
It was born in an era when the rights of men to control and dominate the public
spheres of the economy, politics, law, and culture were unquestioned. It may
have been shaken a little by the increasing claims of women to participate in
life beyond the private sphere, but it nonetheless has settled into a rather self-
satisfied middle age in which society accommodates women by changing
slogans or vocabulary. The Universal Declaration needs a mid-life crisis of
identity to force it to reexamine its existence in a radical way and to launch it
into an energetic middle age that is not set in traditional male patterns. This
is, of course, an unpredictable journey that may antagonize those who have
relied on the Universal Declaration as a stable symbol of international values.
First, I will set forth the limited attention that the text of the Universal
Declaration gives to women's lives. Then, I will describe some of the recent
feminist critiques of the U.N. human rights system and the U.N.'s responses
to these critiques. Finally, I will present some possible outcomes of a produc-
tive mid-life crisis of the Universal Declaration.
11 Text of the Universal Declaration
Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the Commission on Human Rights's (CHR)
drafting committee that was responsible for the Universal Declaration. All of
the other committee members were men. The language of the Universal
Declaration reflects this uneven representation of the sexes. The new Com-
mission on the Status of Women (CSW), however, kept a watching brief on the
creation of the instrument. John Humphrey's account of the drafting of the
Universal Declaration notes that the CSW successfully objected to Rene
Cassin's draft of article 1 that stated: "All men are brothers. Being endowed
[with] reason, members of one family, they are free and possess equal dignity
and rights."2 The final version of article 1 refers to human "beings" as born
free and equal in dignity and rights, but article 1 nevertheless retains a refer-
ence to "the spirit of brotherhood."3 Throughout the Universal Declaration,
"man" is used as a general category (although the terms "human beings" and
"person" are also used) and the male pronoun is used consistently.4 We now
2. John P. Humphrey, The UniversalDeclaration ofHuman Rights: Its History, Impact
and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-
TION 21, 25 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
3. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 1.
4. Id.
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know that such word use is significant in reinforcing hierarchies based on
gender, even if the drafters intended the language to be generic. The origins
of the use of the masculine as generic were to give prominence and deference
to men.5 It is still often unclear whether a writer's intention in using mascu-
line terms is to signify a generic category. As Helen Bequaert Holmes writes
regarding the use of "generic" masculine terms, "[a] man is sure that he is
included; a woman is uncertain."'
The Universal Declaration does, however, implicitly or explicitly ac-
knowledge women in a number of articles. Article 2 promises entitlement to
the rights set out in the Universal Declaration "without distinction of any
kind," including sex.7 A more general guarantee of nondiscrimination in
article 7 does not refer to any categories of discrimination.' Article 16 sets
forth the right for "[m]en and women of full age" to marry and to have a
family.9 The right to an adequate standard of living in article 25 refers specifi-
cally to the need for security in the event of widowhood.'0 It also states that
"[m]otherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance.""'
The Universal Declaration's acknowledgment of women's lives clearly
is quite limited. Women enter the picture only insofar as they are connected
to men. The Universal Declaration depicts women as wives and mothers and,
in the latter capacity, as particularly vulnerable individuals. The constant
references to the family in the Universal Declaration reinforce the restricted
image of women. In fact, the Universal Declaration presents the family as "the
natural and fundamental group unit of society" and as a unit that is "entitled to
protection by society and the State."'2 The langtage of the Universal Declara-
tion suggests that a family comprises only a heterosexual married couple and
their offspring. Indeed, the Universal Declaration assumes that the primary
purpose of marriage is to have children. In a marriage, a woman will be
economically dependent on her husband such that, if she is widowed, she will
have a special claim to social security." One could interpret the Universal
Declaration as indicating that the right to leave a marriage is very limited,
although the Universal Declaration does provide equal rights to men and
5. DALE SPENDER, MAN MADE LANGUAGE 147-48 (1980).
6. Helen Bequaertl-olmes, A FeministAnalysis ofthe Universal Deelaration ofiHuman
Rights, in BEYOND DOMINATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 250, 259
(Carol C. Gould ed., 1983).
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 2.
8. See id. art. 7 (implying that women and men enjoy same protections under law).
9. Id. art. 16.
10. See id. art. 25 (stating that everyone has right to adequate standard of living).
11. Id.
12. Id. arL 16.
13. Id. art. 25.
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women on dissolution of marriage. 4 The Universal Declaration's emphasis
on the family as the foundation of society also may suggest that human rights
are not applicable within the family context. The sacrosanct image of the
family in the Universal Declaration discourages proper scrutiny of whether the
rights to life, liberty, freedom from slavery, and security of the person are
realized within particular family contexts.'5
Fifty years after its drafting, we can see that the Universal Declaration has
limits. For example, the Universal Declaration contains no reference to self-
determination nor to the rights of minorities. Can we now single out its
provisions and silences with respect to women? One might argue that this
would be an unfair use of current standards to assess a fifty-year-old document.
However, international concern with the position of women in particular
contexts was well-established at the time of the drafting of the Universal
Declaration. For example, prior to the Universal Declaration, there were
conventions on trafficking in women and on women in the work place. 6 This
suggests that human rights relevant to women's lives were seen as a discrete
and separate category to the "general" human rights guarantees that were
designed with men in mind. Moreover, the Universal Declaration's image of
women is reflected in all of the subsequent "general" international human
rights treaties. These documents similarly rely on a generalized male experi-
ence and attend to a very limited notion of women's lives. Women's submis-
sion to male authority appears as a "natural" consequence of their reproductive
role.'7 In other words, as Spike Peterson writes, "a woman's capacity for
biological reproduction becomes essentialized as her nature; the 'givenness'
of this capacity is then extended to the entire process of social reproduction,
thereby consigning women to a restricted 'family' domain."'"
The Universal Declaration, then, began its life with a limited acknowledg-
ment of women's lives and of the different human rights issues that women
face. Much of the extensive literature on the Universal Declaration reinforces
this lack of relevance that the Universal Declaration has to women's lives. For
example, a volume of essays published to commemorate the thirtieth anniver-
sary of the Universal Declaration did not contain any reference to women's
human rights. 9 It identified the major unfinished business as implemen-
14. Id. art. 16.
15. See Holmes, supra note 6, at 253.
16. See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and
Children, 9 L.N.T.S. 415 (1921); Underground Work (Women) Convention, 1935, International
Labour Organisation <http:llwww.ilo.orgpublicenglish/90travailcis/ilostandards/c045.htm>.
17. See V. Spike Peterson, Whose Rights? A Critique of the "Givens" in Human Rights
Discourse, XV ALTERNATIVES 303, 314-15 (1990).
18. Id.
19. See generally HUMANPGHTS: THIRTYYEARS AFTER THEUNIVERSAL DECLARATION,
supra note 2.
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tation.2° According to these essays, the first standard-setting phase of the
human rights system was largely complete. The only question that the authors
raised regarding the nature of the standards was a concern about the differing
concepts of human rights that were held by Western, Socialist, and Third
World states.21 The contributors to the book cautioned against abandoning the
notion of universality of rights and argued that "certain common values...
transcend differences of race, faith, political structure, culture and economic
development.., which are based on the equality, freedom and solidarity of all
men."2
III Feminist Critiques of the UN. Human Rights System
Although treaties devoted to particular rights of women were adopted by
the U.N. system in the 1950s,' recognition that the U.N. human rights system
did not adequately respond to women's situations did not begin until after the
1975 Mexico World Conference on the International Women's Year that
launched the U.N. Decade for Women (1976-85).24 The adoption of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women in 1979 elaborated on the norm of nondiscrimination on the basis of
sex.' It took another decade for women to begin interrogating the generally
applicable human rights instruments and to show that, in fact, they gave
particular prominence and protection to men's lives.
There is now significant literature critiquing the international system for
the protection of human rights from a feminist perspective.26 Following are the
main themes of this work:
20. See, e.g., Kamleshwar Das, Some Reflections on Implementing Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNVEPRSAL DECLARATION, supra note 2, at 131,
133-34.
21. H. Gros Espiell, The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western, Socialist and
Third WorldApproaches, in HUMANRIGHTS: THIRTYYEARSAFTERTHEUNwERSALDECLARA-
TION, supra note 2, at 41, 41-42.
22. Nicolas Valticos, The Role of the ILO: Present Action and Future Perspectives, in
HuMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 2, at 211,
213.
23. See, e.g., Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S.
135.
24. Report of the World Conference of the International Women's Year, July 2, 1975,
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 66/34.
25. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms offDiscrimination Against Women, Dec.
18, 1979, art. 3, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
26. See generally HuMANRIGHTs OF WOMEN: NATIONALAND INTERNATIONALPERSPEC-
TivEs (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (evaluating international human rights from feminist
perspective); WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS: AREFERENcE GUIDE (Kelly Askin & Dorean Koenig
eds., forthcoming 1998); WOMEN's RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PER-
SPECTIVES (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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1. Feminist activists and scholars point out that there exists an absence
of women in the processes of defining and implementing human rights stan-
dards. For example, none of the human rights treaty-monitoring bodies (apart
from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women)
have an equal number of women and men members.27 Many see this non-
participation by women as a human rights issue in itself. Many scholars also
conclude that the lack of participation by women is connected to the lopsided
concerns of the traditional human rights canon.2"
2. The monitoring and enforcement of the specialized women's treaties
is weaker than that of their "general" counterparts. For example, the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women is
monitored only through a reporting system.29 The International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination," the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3' and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,32 on the
other hand, offer reporting as well as individual33 and state complaine4 mecha-
nisms. Moreover, the institutions designed to promote and monitor the obser-
vance of women's human rights have less resources than the comparable
institutions of "general" human rights.3
3. The traditional human rights canon does not cover issues that have a
particular significance for women. For example, the issues of illiteracy,
development, and sexual violence are dealt with in "soft" law instruments but
are not addressed in legally binding norms. Moreover, international law
focuses on states as the primary violators of human rights. More significant
arethe activities ofnonstate actors, such as international monetary institutions,
which have the power to impose social and economic conditions that can
27. See Hilary Charlesworth, Transforming the United Men 's Club: Feminist Futuresfor
the United Nations, 4 TRANsNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 421, 423-24 (1994).
28. Id.at438-39.
29. Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms ofDiscrimination Against Women, supra
note 25, art. 18.
30. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
31. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171.
32. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
33. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 31, arts. 14, 22.
34. Id. art. 41.
35. See Andrew C. Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights Treaty Body: The Work of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 56-58
(1989) (discussing lack of resources available to committees working to protect human rights
of women); Laura Reanda, The Commission on the Status of Women, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HuMAN RIGHTS 265, 300-01 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).
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adversely affect women's lives through their loans.3 6
4. The ideas ofequality and nondiscrimination that animate the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the
flagship of women's human rights, are very limited in the sense that they
promise equality on male-defined terms only. The terms of the Convention
require that women be treated in the same way as a similarly situated man.
The Convention does not recognize the effects of structural discrimination
against women.37
5. Feminists have argued that the focus on activities that occur in the
public sphere introduces a significant bias against women into human rights
law. For example, the accepted international definition of "torture" requires
the involvement of a "public official."38 Also, the guarantee of a right to work
applies to the paid, public workforce only.3 9 Although many women do suffer
from this public type of human rights violation, the violations of rights that
take place in the "private" sphere are much more significant in women's lives
globally."
6. More generally, the model of human nature that underlies the human
rights tradition is gendered and cannot claim to have an "objective" core. The
Western, liberal, and individualistic underpinnings of human rights law all
contribute to its male bias.4 Feminists from the South have particularly criti-
cized the Western framework of human rights law and indeed of much feminist
criticism.42
36. Anne Orford, Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of
Human Rights, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. (forthcoming 1998).
37. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, FeministApproaches
to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 631-32 (1991) (discussing "equality" as proposed
by Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
38. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, supra note 32, art. 1.
39. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
40. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Worlds Apart: Public/Private Distinctions inlnterna-
tionalLaw, in PUBLICANDPRIvATE: FEMNSTLEGALDEBATES 243,248-51 (MargaretThornton
ed., 1995) (discussing neglect of women's private rights in international laws); CelinaRomany,
State Responsibility Goes Private: 4 Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in
International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 26, at 85, 85-87 (discussing neglect of women's human rights
in private sphere of familial relationships). Not all feminist critics of international human rights
law share this view. Karen Engle, for example, argues that it may be in women's best interests
to resist legal incursions into the "private" sphere. Using the analogy of international trade law,
she speculatesthattheprovince ofthe mostpowerful may be outside ofthe scope ofinternational
legal regulation. Karen Engle,.After the Collapse ofthePublic/PrivateDistinction: Strategizing
Women's Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALrrY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, 149-50
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
41. See Peterson, supra note 17, at 308-32.
42. See, e.g., J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "The Personal Is Political," or Why
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7. Even when women can be shown to have suffered violations of human
rights in the traditional, male-defined sense, these violations are given much
less attention and publicity than is accorded to violations of men's rights. For
example, the reports by the special rapporteurs of the Commission on Human
Rights have typically ignored human rights violations against women.43 The
methods of investigating and documenting human rights abuses can often
obscure or even conceal abuses against women. As a result, the U.N.'s "fact
finding" in Rwanda in 1994 did not detect systematic sexual violence against
women until nine months after the attack and genocide, when women began
to give birth in unprecedented numbers.'
8. Society justifies many violations of women's rights on the grounds
that the violations are an aspect of particular religious or cultural practices.45
States, religious communities, and individuals invoke the rights to religious
freedom or cultural integrity as "trumping" women's rights.46 The pattern of
reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimina-
tion Against Women provides a good example of this phenomenon. 7
IV.. UN. Responses
How has the U.N. system responded to the wave of feminist critiques of
its protection of human rights? On one level, the response has been surpris-
ingly rapid and impressive. For example, atthe United Nations World Confer-
ence on Human Rights in 1993, the international community formally recog-
nized that the human rights system did not adequately respond to women's
lives.48 The community committed itself to the furtherance of the belief that
the human rights of women were "an inalienable, integral and indivisible part
of universal human rights."49 It also accepted that gender-specific violations
Women's Rights.Are IndeedHuman Rights: AnAfrican Perspective on International Feminism,
17 HuM. RTS. Q. 691, 697-705 (1995).
43. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP, REPORTNO. 1, ToKEN GEsTUREs:
WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS AND UN REPORTING 5-6 (1993).
44. Anne Gallagher, Ending the Marginalization: Strategies for Incorporating Women
into the United Nations Human Rights System, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 283, 292 n.31 (1997).
45. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Dis-
course, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMANRIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINISTPERSPECTIvES, supra
note 26, at 167, 167.
46. Id. at 167-69.
47. Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 297-98 (1991); Rebecca J. Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643, 673-78 (1990).
48. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Oct. 13, 1993, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/24 18, at 33, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661.
49. Id.
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of human rights were part of the human rights agenda." Another significant
development was the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in December 1993."' The
Declaration contains a broad definition of the notion of gender-based
violence. 2 It acknowledges gender-based violence as an international issue
and more specifically, as an issue of sex discrimination. 3 The Beijing Decla-
ration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on
Women in September 1995, identifies the human rights of women as a critical
area of concern. 54
While these developments have generally been hailed by feminist scholars
and activists, they are worth a closer look. How far do they respond to the
criticisms of the international human rights system outlined above? It is
striking that the assertion that "[w]omen's rights are human rights," while
contained in the Beijing Declaration,55 is not reiterated in the more action-
oriented Platform for Action because of an apparent anxiety of states about
recognizing "new" human rights.56 Thus, the Platform distinguishes between
human rights of women (meaning the application of the traditional human
rights canon to women), which are universal and women's rights (meaning
rights that are of especial relevance to women only), which are not universal.
Moreover, the model of women's existence presupposed by the Beijing Plat-
form is quite restricted. Although the Platform for Action gives a nod in the
direction of the diversity of women's experiences,57 it nevertheless presents
50. Id. art. 2.
51. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg. at 217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
52. Id. art. 2.
53. Id. art. 5.
54. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 177/20 (1995),
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 401, 405.
55. Id.9 14.
56. Dianne Otto, A Post-Beiing Reflection on the Limitations and Potential ofHuman
Rights Discourse for Women, in WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS REFERENCE GUIDE (Kelly Askin &
Dorean Koenig eds., forthcoming 1998).
57. Paragraph 46 of Chapter IV of the Beijing Platform for Action states:
The Platform for Action recognizes that women face barriers to full equality and
advancement because of such factors as their race, age, language, ethnicity, culture,
religion or disability, because they are indigenous women or because of other status.
Many women encounter specific obstacles related to their family status, particularly
as single parents; and to their socio-economic status, including their living condi-
tions in rural, isolated or impoverished areas. Additional barriers also exist for
refugee women, other displaced women, including internally displaced women as
well for immigrantwomen andmigrantwomen, includingwomen migrantworkers.
Many women are also particularly affected by environmental disasters, serious and
infectious diseases and various forms of violence against women.
Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 54, 46.
789
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women in a very limited and encumbered way. The major role for women
remains that which is described in the Universal Declaration - wife and
mother. As Dianne Otto points out in her analysis of the Beijing negotiations,
the only acknowledged development in the role of women is that women are
expected to participate in decision-making structures and to play a part in the
free market economy. 8 Attempts to raise the diversity of women's identities,
most particularly with respect to sexual orientation, were unsuccessful at
Beijing. 9
The new international concern with women's rights also is limited in the
way it understands the notion of equality. Although there have been signifi-
cant moves to recognize some gendered harms, particularly violence against
women, the major remedy for the global subordination of women has been to
increase women's roles in decision-making. 0 This simply allows women
access to a world that is already constituted by men. Dianne Otto argues that
"[i]n the absence of-a recognition that the decision-making structures must
themselves change, it is not clearwhat difference women's equal participation
could make. Ultimately, it may merely equally implicate women in the perpet-
uation of the masculinist liberal forms ofminimalist representative democracy
and capitalist economics."61 The new international discourse on women's
rights also gives prominence to civil and political rights of women at the
expense of economic and social rights. Health and reproductive rights are
much more likely to be controversial in international fora than civil rights.62
Although the feminization of poverty clearly is acknowledged in the Beijing
Platform,63 it was not placed squarely in a rights context.' It has been noted
that the Platform "assumes... that capitalism has the ability to deliver eco-
nomic equality to the poor women of the world and... that the obligation of
states to guarantee certain economic and social rights is made redundant by the
more 'efficient' processes of free market forces."6" The practices of interna-
tional monetary institutions such as the World Bank and International Mone-
tary Fund also have serious implications for economic and social rights. The
narrow notion of development that animates these institutions elevates private
58. Dianne Otto, Holding Up Half the Sky, Butfor Whose Benefit?: A Critical Analysis
of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 6AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST L.J. 7,25-27 (1996).
59. Id. at 25.
60. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 54, 142(a), 253(a).
61. Otto, supra note 56.
62. See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 54, 162-164 (express-
ing Holy See's reservation on Beijing Platform's section on women and health).
63. Id. 47-57.
64. Id. But see id. at 27 (referring, in Strategic Objective A.2, to women's equal rights
to economic resources but refraining from elaborating on that idea).
65. Otto, supra note 56.
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sector interests over public funding for food, health, education, and social
security.6
In the last few years, the various levels of the U.N. human rights machin-
ery have shown an interest in women's rights. In March 1994, the CHR
appointed RadhikaCoomaraswamy as Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women. Coomaraswamy is the first Special Rapporteur with a gender-specific
mandate. 7 Some of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies have an-
nounced changes to their procedures in order to better respond to women's
concerns. In 1995, for example, the Centre for Human Rights in collaboration
with the United Nations Development Fund for Women organized a meeting
of experts to create guidelines for "mainstreaming" gender perspectives into
the human rights system. 8 Also, the CSW currently is considering a draft
Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention that would allow individual and
group complaints of noncompliance with the Convention. 9
Thus, the international community seems to have accepted the rhetoric of
women's rights. What effect has this had in practice? I will focus on the
commitmentto "gendermainstreaming" inthe U.N. human rights treaty bodies.
The treaty monitoring bodies' responses to calls for "gender mainstreaming"
have been varied. The reactions differ depending on the presence of at least
one or two committee members who have a true commitment to the issue. At
one end of the spectrum, there have been significant advances. For example,
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, has taken the
task of gender mainstreaming seriously, referring to the position of women in
its concluding observations on states parties' reports and in general com-
ments.70 Its reporting guidelines, however, are uneven with respect to gender
issues. Gender is not referred to with respect to some important articles, such
as the right to free primary education set out in article 14 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.7' In contrast, the Commit-
66. See Orford, supra note 36.
67. See Report on the Fiftieth Session, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Human Rights, 50th
Sess., Supp. No. 4, at 140-41, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/132 (1994) (renewing Coomaraswamy's
gender-specific mandate).
68. Follow-Up to the Fourth World Conference on Women: Review of Mainstreaming
in Organizations of the United Nations System, U.N. ESCOR Commission on the Status of
Women, 40th Sess., 20, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/199619 (1996).
69. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Including the Elaboration of a Draft Optional Protocol, to the Convention, U.N. ESCOR
Commission on the Status of Women, 42d Sess., art. 2, U.N. Doc. EICN.6/19981WGIL.2
(1998).
70. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 39, arts.
3,7.
71. See Gallagher, supra note 44, at 301.
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tee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which monitors the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
does not include gender considerations at all in its concluding observations or
in its general comments, although the intersection of race and sex discrimina-
tion is an important and controversial area. 2 The Chairman of CERD stated
in 1996 that directives to integrate gender into states parties' reports were
"fundamentally misconceived."' Similarly, the Committee Against Torture
has not displayed any concern with the gendered aspects of torture.74
The Human Rights Committee, the committee that monitors the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, is regarded as one of the most
progressive of the treaty monitoring bodies with respect to women, due at least
recently in large part to its distinguished women members such as Elizabeth
Evatt and Cecilia Medina. It has adopted a number of useful general com-
ments on articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
that show a sensitivity to gender issues. Also, in 1995, the Committee
amended its reporting guidelines to request states parties to provide informa-
tion on the position of women.
As Jane Connors observes, however, the Committee is not consistent in
its concern with gender.75 Most of the Committee's general comments do not
address the position of women. A 1994 general comment on torture did not
examine the gendered dimensions of the right to be free from torture, although
it did refer to the need for states parties to address the infliction of torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by private actors.76 On the other hand,
the Committee has used its concluding observations in a number of cases in a
progressive way. For example, in 1996, the Committee's concluding com-
ments on Peru's periodic report under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights express concern "about criminalization of abortion even in
cases of rape," which results in "backyard" abortions as the major cause of
maternal mortality.77 The Committee stated that "these provisions not only
mean that women are subjectto inhumane treatment but are possibly incompat-
ible with articles 3, 6 and 7 of the Covenant."7
72. See id. at 304.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Jane Connors, General Human Rights Instruments and Their Relevance to Women,
in ADVANCING THEHUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: USING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS IN DOMES-
TIC LITIGATION 27, 33 (Andrew C. Byrnes et al. eds., 1997).
76. Compilations of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by the
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, General cmt. 20(44), U.N. Doc. HRI/GENI1/Rev.1 at 30 (1994).
77. Christine Ainetter Brautigam, Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in the Work of
the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 389, 392-93 (John Lawrence
Hargrove ed., 1997).
78. Id. at 393.
MID-LIFE CRISIS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
The Committee has given a mixed reception to complaints under the
Optional Protocol involving gender issues. The Committee has found that
cases of direct discrimination on the basis of sex - for example, a Mauritian
law that gave greater status to foreign wives of Mauritian men than to foreign
husbands of Mauritian women79 - breach the article 26 guarantee of nondis-
crimination. However, in other cases of direct discrimination on the basis of
sex, the Committee has permitted a considerable margin of appreciation to
states. For example, in Vos v. The Netherlands,0 the Committee found that a
Dutch law that allowed disabled men to retain a disability allowance on the
death of their wives but that did not allow disabled women to retain disability
on the death of their husbands was not aviolation of article 26.8 The Commit-
tee also has had much more difficulty with cases that involve laws or practices
that are facially gender neutral but that, in effect, discriminate against women.
Overall, gender mainstreaming has had a mixed fate. It has been rela-
tively easy to obtain a revision of reporting guidelines but much more difficult
to obtain practical follow-through on these revisions, such as through the
systematic questioning of states.8 2
V Future Development of Women's Rights in International Law
The sheaf of resolutions that the various U.N. bodies adopted in com-
memoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration acknowl-
edge in various ways that there are significant problems with the international
protection of rights. These resolutions outline the major concerns with the
Universal Declaration's protection of rights as nondissemination and non-
implementation of the pertinent Universal Declaration provisions.83 In other
words, the problems are external to the Universal Declaration and to the U.N.
human rights system itself. The U.N. bodies see the Universal Declaration as
having a continuing and universal relevance. To these U.N. bodies, then, the
cure for the mid-life crisis is better coordination, better promotion, better
evaluation, better information, and better implementation. I argue, in contrast,
that for women, the Universal Declaration and its progeny themselves may be
the problem.
79. Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, Communication No. 35/1978, in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 67, 71 (1985).
80. Communication No. 218/1986, U.N. Doc. A/44/40, Annex XI.G, at 232.
81. Vos v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 218/1986, U.N. Doc. A/44/40, Annex
XI.G, at 232.
82. See Brautigam, supra note 77, at 394.
83. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 51/88, U.N. GAOR, 51stSess., 82d plen. mtg. at 231, U.N. Doc.
A/51/49 (1996) (stating that it recognizes "the Declaration as the source of inspiration and the
basis of subsequent progress in the field of human rights" and that it is "[c]oncemed that inter-
national human rights standards are not fully and universally respected, that human rights con-
tinue to be violated in all parts of the world").
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The U.N. human rights system and the Universal Declaration have grown
into middle age. Like many fifty-year-old men today, the Universal Declara-
tion is rather smug in its attitude towards women. The U.N.'s reactions to
criticism of the Universal Declaration include simply ignoring the issue and
hoping that, in time, it will go away. Another argument sometimes made is
that taking the specificity of women's lives into account will undermine the
objectivity and universality of the system. Yet another reaction is that of the
double message -the public use of"politically correct" language acknowledg-
ing the problem and the announcement of special programs to alleviate it, but
failure to tailor the programs to the specific problem or to give enough weight
or resources to the programs to ensure their success. The human rights system
appears to have learned that the art of politically correct rhetoric is an effective
tool in silencing potential critics. It finds it very hard, however, to institute
significant change. The human rights system's responses to the criticisms of
feminist activists and scholars have been very mixed. Generally, the human
rights system has only recognized claims of women that involve rights viola-
tions akin to those that men might sustain.84 Recognition of rights violations
in the "private" sphere are still the exception. For example, the negotiations
on the text of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
in which some states resisted the definition of violence against women as a
human rights issue on the grounds that this would water down the concept of
human rights, 5 indicate the problems of enlarging the androcentric focus of
human rights law. The overarching slogan of the U.N. human rights system
with respect to women seems to be just "add women and stir."86 A mid-life
crisis is necessary for the system to change course in a more radical way to
ensure that there is substantive change.
There has been much debate among feminists about whether human rights
discourse is a useful strategy. Many have argued, for example, that civil and
political rights are manipulable, individualistic, and unlikely to respond to the
more general structural disadvantages that women face. 7 In my view, how-
ever, the significance of human rights discourse outweighs its disadvantages.
Human rights provide an alternative language and framework to the existing
welfare and protection approach to the global situation of women as victims
or dependents. 8 Human rights allow women to claim specific entitlements
from a specified obligation-holder. Moreover, there are international, regional,
and national systems in place that can be invoked to protect human rights.
84. Connors, supra note 75, at 37.
85. See Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, Violence Against Women: A Global
Issue, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE AND THE LAW 13, 24-25 (J. Stubbs ed., 1994).
86. See Christine Chinkin, Feminist Interventions Into International Law, 19 ADEL. L.
REV. 13, 18 (1997).
87. CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 138-57 (1989).
88. See Brautigam, supra note 77, at 390.
MID-LIFE CRISIS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
Human rights discourse is the dominant progressive moral philosophy operat-
ing at the global level.89 It is important for women to engage in such discourse
and contest its parameters.
What might the Universal Declaration's mid-life crisis produce? One
outcome could be attention to the gendered model of human nature embedded
in the human rights system. Just as some men at fifty suddenly regret the
limitations of traditional male roles, the human rights system should develop
rights responding to the life experiences of women, rather than forcing women
to articulate their concerns in terms of rights based on male lives. Radhika
Coomaraswamy, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
proposes the creation of a "fourth generation" of women's rights." This
"fourth generation" of rights includes "new" rights such as the right to sexual
autonomy as well as a reinterpretation of the earlier generations of rights in
order to respond to women's concerns.91
The use of an equality paradigm in women's human rights law needs to
be reassessed. While it can offer some progress for women, it also can ration-
alize the deeper inequities in social structures around the world. As Nicola
Lacey writes, the idea of equality as sameness cuts little ice when men and
women are simply running different races.92 Dianne Otto proposes thatwomen
reclaim the language of equity from states that have used it to signal a lesser
standard than equality to achieve substantive redistributive outcomes.93 She
also emphasizes the need to respond to the diversity of women's experiences
in a meaningful way. 4 One way to do this is to focus on economic and social
rights that would draw attention to "the operation of systems of privilege
among women" and the inequitable structures of global capital.95
A mid-life crisis of the Universal Declaration may cause the U.N. to
rethink the significance of arguments of cultural relativism with respect to
women's rights. RadhikaCoomaraswamy argues that, in Asia, the next decade
especially will be marked by the collision of national cultural movements and
the development of women's rights." The debate about cultural difference in
the human rights arena tends to accept male-defined versions of culture as
89. RADHIKACOOMARASWAMY, REvEwoGINTERNATIONALLAW: WOMEN'sRIGHTS
AS HUMAN RIGHTs 4 (1997); Peterson, supra note 17, at 303-04. See generally Anne Orford,
Locating the International: Military andMonetary Interventions after the Cold War, 38 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 443 (1997) (investigating way in which moral philosophies have been generated in
international sphere).
90. CooMARAswAMY, supra note 89, at 25.
91. Id.
92. Nicola Lacey, Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist
Perspective, 14 J.L. & SOC'Y 411,420 (1987).
93. Otto, supra note 56.
94. IM
95. Id.; see Orford, supra note 36.
96. COOMARASWAMY, supra note 89, at 27.
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authoritative. New feminist understandings of culture need to be developed.
Arati Rao proposes that we pay close attention to the politics of arguments
based on culture in human rights discourse.97 For Rao, a critical assessment
of claims based on culture requires investigating the status of the speaker, in
whose name the argument from culture is advanced, and the degree of partici-
pation in culture formation of the social groups primarily affected by the
cultural practices in question.98
Another outcome of a mid-life crisis would be thoroughgoing gender
mainstreaming in the U.N. human rights system, both in the way that the rights
protected by human rights treaties are understood and in the way that the U.N.
human rights machinery deals with them. The development of an optional
complaints procedure to the Women's Convention through the CSW may have
radical potential, especially if such a development allows consideration of
structural gender inequality.
VI. Conclusion
One might say that a basic flaw in my analogy of the Universal Declara-
tion to a man's life is that the Universal Declaration was created to be both
universal and eternal. As Sean MacBride said at the time of the thirtieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration, "the precepts of the [U]niversal
Declaration are immutable and will remain valid forever: the right to life,
freedom from torture, the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention
and other such rights know no bounds of time."99 Emphasis on its middle age
may imply that the Universal Declaration will naturally fade away sometime
before its centenary. Butthe language of rights cannot be fixed. It will always
be contested and its meaning constantly renegotiated. A popular guide to
coping with middle age quotes Carl Jung's statement that: "We cannot live the
afternoon of life according to the programme of life's morning; for what was
great in the morning will be little at evening, and what in the morning was true
will at evening have become a lie."1" In this spirit, I argue that the Universal
Declaration is not based on immutable truth. It is a product of a situated and
partial understanding of the human condition generated by men. If we under-
stand the implicit commitments of the Universal Declaration, we open up
transformative terrain.
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